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TIMoTHY G. PEPPER*
Abusive discovery practices have taken a severe toll on the justice
system's ability to adjudicate disputes. In response, some courts have
stepped up their efforts to sanction litigants for such misconduct. This Note
critiques a recent federal appellate decision that reversed a district court's
imposition of creative and unprecedented sanctions for discovery abuse.
Although this Note supports the appellate court's reliance on the federal
law of inherent powers as a basis for its decision, the Note goes on to argue
that the U.S. Constitution's Case or Controversy Clause provides a more
satisfying rationale.
I. INTRODUCTION
The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
Rules) were adopted in an effort to reduce the element of surprise at trial.2
The legal community believed that the fact-finding process would be
enhanced, and the potential for "ambush" at trial reduced, if all parties had
access to each other's evidence.3 This decision to increase the scope of
pretrial procedure came at a price; the efficiency and speed of litigation were
reduced in return for increased accuracy.4
In recent years, the burden of extensive and unnecessary discovery has
taken a severe toll on the justice system's ability to adjudicate disputes.5
Discovery abuse in major cases can add years to the time between complaint
and judgment, even if all parties obey the letter of the Rules.6 When a party
* The author thanks Anne, Grant, and Lauren Pepper for their tremendous patience
and support.
I See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-36 (setting forth the rules governing the procedure for
obtaining and using depositions, interrogatories, physical and mental examinations,
requests for admission, and the production of documents).
2 See generally Alexander Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal
Practice, 7 VAND. L. REv. 576, 577 (1954) (discussing the desire to change litigation
from a contest of lawyers to a means of deciding controversies on their merits). For an
opposing view, see Margeson v. Boston & Me. R.R., 16 F.R.D. 200, 201 (D. Mass. 1954)
(arguing that the element of surprise can be effective in exposing perjury and preventing
witnesses from tailoring their testimony to that of other witnesses).
3 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (stating that "[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation"). For a theoretical analysis of the ability of discovery to produce more
economically rational out-of-court settlements, see Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal
Costs, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 55, 57-58 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Robert Araujo, The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility, 50 SMU
L. REv. 433, 435 (1997) (discussing the ability of modem discovery practice to introduce
extended delays into litigation).
5 See generally Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal
Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 386-89 (1991) (discussing the decline in the
performance of the judiciary due to delays caused by discovery abuse).
6 Conduct that is abusive can still be, technically, legal. See id. at 387 (reporting that
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intentionally violates the Rules in an effort to abuse the discovery system,
litigation can easily grind to a halt or culminate in a manifestly unjust
resolution.7
The judicial response to discovery abuse has been ineffective. 8 Because
the discovery system was designed to be implemented with minimal
involvement by the court,9 and because judicial resources are already
stretched thin,10 the judiciary has been mostly unable or unwilling to take a
central role in curbing discovery abuse.11 Some courts, though, have taken
strong positions against discovery abuse.12 These judges use the resources
available to them-the sanction provisions of the Rules 13 and their inherent
power to sanction litigant misconduct14 -in an attempt to curb abusive
the self-implementing scheme of the Rules enables lawyers to use discovery "as a
weapon rather than an information gathering mechanism" while remaining within the
letter of the law).
7 See Araujo, supra note 4, at 435-36 (discussing the pressure to accept an unjust
case settlement when a litigant's scarce resources are being consumed by unnecessary
discovery requests).
8 See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing?," 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 681-97 (1995) (detailing
the current dissatisfaction with the judicial system's response to discovery abuse).
9 Judges normally intervene in discovery only upon the motion of a party. See FED.
R. Crv. P. 26(c) (providing that "[u]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought.., the court... may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense. . . "); id. at 37(a) (providing that "[a] party, upon reasonable notice to other
parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling disclosure or
discovery... "). For a comparative analysis of the German judicial system-which
provides for active judicial involvement in the discovery phase of litigation-see John H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 823 (1985).10 See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: Requiescat in
Pace, 173 F.R.D. 565, 606 (1997) (identifying a lack ofjudicial resources as the primary
reason for the "excess cost and delay" in the federal courts).
11 See Meade W. Mitchell, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory
Disclosure, 62 Miss. L.J. 743, 753 (1993) (discussing how previous attempts to increase
judicial supervision of discovery practice have been unsuccessful).
12 The District Court of the Virgin Islands, Stanley S. Brotman, Judge, demonstrated
this commitment to controlling discovery in the Tutu litigation itself. See In re Tutu
Wells Contamination Litig., 162 F.R.D. 46 (D.V.I. 1995) [hereinafter Tutu I]. Although
this Note agrees with the Third Circuit that Judge Brotman's remedy was improper, this
author also agrees with the Third Circuit's approval of Judge Brotman's strong stance
against abusive litigation practices. See infra text accompanying note 25 (discussing the
Third Circuit's praise for Judge Brotman's conscientious response to discovery abuse).
13 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (authorizing sanctions for failure to comply with an
order); id. at 37(c) (authorizing sanctions for failure to disclose, false or misleading
disclosure, or refusal to admit); id. at 37(d) (authorizing sanctions for the failure of a
party to attend its own deposition, serve answers to interrogatories, or respond to requests
for inspection); id. at 37(g) (authorizing sanctions for the failure of a party to participate
in the framing of a discovery plan). The authorized sanctions include the most severe-
outright dismissal of the action or a default judgment, see id. at 37(b)(2)(C), and a
contempt order, see id. at 37(b)(2)(D).14 See infra Part III.A (discussing a federal court's inherent power to sanction
litigant misconduct).
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discovery practices that undermine the search for the truth.
In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation15 is the latest federal
appellate decision addressing the scope of a federal court's inherent power to
sanction litigants for misconduct. The decision strikes down a district court's
imposition of a $1,000,000 sanction for discovery abuse payable to a
"Community Service Sanction Account" earmarked for the renovation of a
correctional facility. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
district court exceeded its inherent power to sanction by making the sanction
payable to a nonparty to the Tutu litigation.
Parts II and III of this Note explain the Tutu decision in detail and place
it in context within the federal law of inherent powers. Parts IV and V
construct an alternative rationale for the Third Circuit's decision by applying
general principles gleaned from the United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Constitution's Case or Controversy Clause. 16 Although
this constitutional analysis is not offered as a critique of the Third Circuit's
decision, it does shed new light on the opinion by demonstrating that the
Case or Controversy Clause provides a more satisfying rationale than the
law of inherent powers.
II. BACKGROUND-FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1987-twelve years ago-a well owner in the Virgin Islands noticed
the smell of gasoline in his well water.17 Investigation by local and federal
officials revealed that the Tutu aquifer, which supplies much of the drinking
water to the Estate Tutu area on the eastern end of St. Thomas, was
contaminated with gasoline and chlorinated organic compounds. 18
Numerous private lawsuits ensued, with many landowners and businesses
attempting either to recover damages, escape liability, or both. 19 The key
15 120 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Tutu IV].
16 Article H, section 2 of the United States Constitution-the Case or Controversy
Clause-provides in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens
of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.17 See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 373.
18See id. at 371, 373; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 43
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 89, 90 (1994) (reporting that 22 commercial,
residential, and public wells were contaminated with petrochemicals and volatile organic
compounds, thus exposing 11,000 people to cancer-causing poisons for approximately
twenty years before the contamination was discovered).19 See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 373.
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players for the purposes of this Note are Esso Standard Oil S.A. Ltd., Esso
Virgin Islands, Inc., Esso Standard Oil Co. (Puerto Rico) (collectively
referred to as the "Esso Defendants"), and their former law firm of
Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli & Axtmayer (referred to as "Goldman
Antonetti").20 The Esso Defendants brought an action for contribution from
other defendants under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).21 Goldman Antonetti
represented the Esso Defendants in the discovery stage of this phase of the
litigation and participated in the conduct that led to sanctions against the
Esso Defendants and Goldman Antonetti.
The District Court of the Virgin Islands, Stanley S. Brotman, Judge,
sanctioned the Esso Defendants and Goldman Antonetti for three main
groups of discovery abuses. First, the court found that the Esso Defendants
and Goldman Antonetti willfully abused the discovery process by employing
tactics designed to delay, oppress, or harass their opponents. 22 Second, the
court found that the Esso Defendants and Goldman Antonetti intentionally
suppressed a vitally important piece of scientific evidence and lied to the
court in the process. 23 Third, the court found that the Esso Defendants and
their counsel purposely failed to comply with a magistrate judge's order for
an inspection of the contaminated site.24 Judge Brotman's anger at this
conduct is apparent in his three written opinions pertaining to the sanction
proceedings; he begins his third and final opinion with the lamentation that
"[d]uring the past twenty years as a United States District Judge, I cannot
recall being involved with a more disturbing proceeding." 25
20 The Esso Defendants were no longer represented by Goldman Antonetti at the
commencement of the sanction proceedings. See Tutu I, 162 F.R.D. 46, 51 (D.V.I. 1995).
Goldman Antonetti has since changed its name to Goldman, Antonetti & Cordova. See
Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 374 n.2.
21 See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 373. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or the "Superfund Act") imposes
strict joint and several liability on those who create Superfund clean-up sites. See
CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1994).2 2 See Tutu I, 162 F.R.D. at 71. The court stated:
The evidence establishes that the tactics engaged in by... both counsel and
client, for several years in the litigation of this case, were calculated to frustrate and
exhaust the opposition.... [The Esso Defendants' and Goldman Antonetti's]
campaign in this litigation was one of misdirection, delay, oppressive pleadings,
expense and harassment.
Id.
23 See id. at 70-71 ("[P]rejudice to all parties derives, in the first instance, from
the.., concealment of the documents.... The importance of these documents cannot be
argued. It was vital if not critical evidence that was withheld from both the parties and
the local and federal agencies for more than two years. .. !).2 4 See id. at 53 ("[T]his court finds that counsel's disregard of the [inspection order]
was willful and in bad faith and cannot be excused as 'zealous' advocacy.").2 5 In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 166 F.R.D. 331, 334 (D.V.I. 1996)
[hereinafter Tutu III]. Despite disagreeing with his choice of sanction, this author agrees
with Judge Brotman's disgust with the unprofessional and unethical tactics of the Esso
Defendants and Goldman Antonetti. This Note critiques Judge Brotman's method, but
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A. The Formulation of the Community Service Sanction Account
Judge Brotman began the task of formulating appropriate sanctions by
identifying his goals: to deter future litigants from abusing the discovery
process and "to impose a sanction which would result in a positive benefit to
the Virgin Islands."26 Although deterrence is a common objective of
discovery sanctions,27 benefiting a nonparty to the litigation is not.28
Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, Judge Brotman held that "the [Federal]
Rules [of Civil Procedure] and statutes do not provide explicitly for
sanctions which redress the harm to the St. Thomas community."29
Furthermore, the Rules and statutes did not provide a mechanism for
increasing the penalty due to the egregious bad faith of the violators.30 His
response was "to travel a novel path in [his] approach to the imposition of
sanctions" 31 and rely solely on the creative use of the court's inherent
powers.32
Judge Brotman first noted that nonmonetary sanctions against the Esso
Defendants and Goldman Antonetti would be inappropriate if they affected
the outcome of the underlying litigation.33 He could have stricken the Esso
Defendants' pleadings and dismissed the contribution action or any part of
it,34 but to do so would have "reward[ed] other parties who are themselves
fully supports the imposition of severe sanctions.
The Third Circuit also expressed its respect for Judge Brotman by referring to him
as an "extraordinarily able district judge," Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 373, and noting that
"[w]e appreciate the sense of outrage that motivated the district court's decision." Id. at
385. The Third Circuit went on to explain that "a court does not always do well by doing
good. Though we applaud the district court's motives, we are constrained to find fault
with its remedy." Id.
26 Tutu I1, 166 F.R.D. at 334.
27 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes of 1983 (stating that
"Rule 26(g) is designed to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition
of sanctions"); id. at 37 advisory committee's notes of 1993 (stating that the automatic
exclusion sanction called for by Rule 37(c) "provides a strong inducement for disclosure
of material that the disclosing party would expect to use as evidence").
28 See infra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of precedent for
civil sanctions that directly benefit nonparties).
29 Tutu I1, 166 F.R.D. at 339. As the Third Circuit noted, it is unlikely that any such
grant of authority to the judiciary would be constitutional. See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 385
n.18 ("In order to provide such power [to benefit nonparties] ... this must be a power
that Congress can constitutionally delegate to a coordinate branch .... [This] criter[ion]
is [not] satisfied here.").
30 As Judge Brotman phrased it, "neither the Rules nor the applicable statutes
address the issue of increasing the sanctions where, as here, the conduct shows a pattern
of conduct designed to delay or impede the development of the environmental science of
the case." Tutu I1, 166 F.R.D. at 339 n.9.
31 Id. at 334.
3 2 See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing a district court's ability
to properly ignore the sanctions provided for in the Rules and statutes).
33 See Tutu 11, 166 F.R.D. at 339.
3 4 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (authorizing a district court to issue "[a]n order
striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
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violators of our environmental laws."35 Optimal deterrence of environmental
violations was only possible if all violators were made to pay. Thus, having
determined that some other sanction (i.e., one that would operate without
regard to the underlying litigation in Tutu) was necessary, Judge Brotman
"canvassed the literature... concerning sanctions [and] identified few
alternatives to the routine [and, to Judge Brotman, unsatisfactory] monetary
sanction of fee shifting."'36 After reviewing the relative merits of two of
these alternatives-fines payable to the court37 and community service-
Judge Brotman found that each of these sanctions, alone, would be
inadequate.38 Judge Brotman's solution was to combine fines with
community service and "require the Esso Defendants and their former
counsel to fund a community service project which will benefit the St.
Thomas community-the party perhaps most aggrieved by their
sanctionable conduct." 39 Judge Brotman then ordered that the Esso
Defendants pay $750,000 and Goldman Antonetti pay $250,000 toward a
"Community Service Sanction Account" for the "correction of the
unconstitutional conditions and practices existing at the Criminal Justice
Complex in St. Thomas."40
judgment by default against the disobedient party.. ."). Federal courts have these
options available to them even when relying solely upon their inherent power to sanction.
See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980) (holding that federal
courts have the inherent power to dismiss a case outright or impose any lesser sanction).
35 Tutu III, 166 F.R.D. at 340. Judge Brotman also wished "to separate the merits of
the underlying litigation from these sanction proceedings," id. at 339, in order to comply
with the Third Circuit's "preference that cases be disposed of on the merits whenever
practicable," Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984).
36 Tutu III, 166 F.R.D. at 345.
37 Fines made "payable into the court" for discovery violations are deposited by the
court into the United States Treasury. See 28 U.S.C. § 751(e) (1994) (requiring the Clerk
of Court to transfer "all fees, costs and other moneys collected by him" to the United
States Treasury); see also Tutu I1, 166 F.R.D. at 346 (describing the imposition of fines
payable to the court as a method of "generat[ing] funds for the United States Treasury").38 See Tutu 111, 166 F.R.D. at 346-47 (rejecting a fine because "[i]n addition to their
potential to underdeter sanctionable conduct, fines fail to benefit the parties and
community affronted by the sanctionable conduct because the sanctioned parties
ordinarily pay such fines directly to the federal govemment"); id. at 348-49 (rejecting
community service because "the court could conceivably be required to oversee the
efforts of tens, if not hundreds, of individuals over an extended period of time").
39 Id. at 345. According to Judge Brotman, "the true harm arising from the
sanctionable conduct in this matter is one which has rarely been addressed by any of the
parties: the impact on the community for the contamination to its most precious
resource-naturally occurring fresh water." Id.. at 349. During a 1992 inspection, local
and federal authorities found that some of the contaminated wells had been illegally
reopened for use due to water shortages on St. Thomas and the general economic
hardship brought about by the contamination. See U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, supra note 18, at 89.
40 Tutu I1, 166 F.R.D. at 350-52. Judge Brotman chose the Criminal Justice
Complex partly because he was "thoroughly conversant" with its unconstitutional
conditions-he had previously presided over class-action litigation that resulted in a
settlement agreement between the government of the Virgin Islands and the inmates of
the Criminal Justice Complex. See id. at 350 n.21. In the two years between this
settlement and Judge Brotman's creation of the Community Service Sanction Account,
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B. The Third Circuit's Review of the Community Service Sanction
Account
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Brotman's order
directing the Esso Defendants and Goldman Antonetti to fund the
Community Service Sanction Account.41 The Court of Appeals decided that
Judge Brotman's "actions [were] essentially legislative in nature" and
"ventured well beyond the case and controversy before it."42 The court did
not discuss or cite to the "case or controversy" jurisdictional requirement in
the United States Constitution,43 though, and instead based its decision on
the conclusion that Judge Brotman had exceeded his inherent powers.44
Thus, the decision does not place a constitutional limit on a district court's
inherent powers; it merely holds that the Community Service Sanction
Account was so "legislative" in nature that it exceeded whatever amorphous
boundaries do exist on the district court's inherent power to sanction.45
Further discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion requires a brief
introduction to the federal law of inherent powers.
1I. INHERENT POWERS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Overview of Inherent Powers
A court's inherent powers, as the term implies, spring from the very
existence of the court itself.46 A court cannot administer justice without
control over the conduct of the proceedings before it. This inherent power
does not require legislative grace for its existence: "It has long been
understood that '[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our
Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot
be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of
all others.' 47 Thus, inherent powers are "governed not by rule or statute but
by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."'48
"[p]rimarily as a result of a complete lack of funding, the Virgin Island officials have
failed to comply with the terms of the agreement; thus, the inmates continue to suffer
these extreme conditions which constitute violations of their civil rights." Id. at 351.
41 See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d 368, 385 (3d Cir. 1997). Of course, not all litigants appeal
this type of community service sanction. See Milo Geyelin, DuPont, Atlanta Law Firm
Agree to Pay Nearly $11.3 Million in Benlate Matter, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1999, at A18
(reporting a discovery sanction requiring that the defendant and its law firm establish
ethics programs at all four of Georgia's law schools).
42 Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 384.
43 See supra note 16 for the full text of the Case or Controversy Clause.
44 See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 383.
45 See id. at 883-85.
46 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (stating that inherent
powers derive from the very nature of courts ofjustice).
47 Id. (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
48 Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (holding that a federal
district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a suit as an inherent power
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The impossibility of legislatively regulating the federal courts' inherent
powers-combined with an unelected judiciary and life appointment 49-
makes a court's use of inherent powers a rather momentous event. In one
sense, inherent powers are not unlike the power of judicial review. In both
instances an unelected and almost unaccountable federal official (an Article
III judge) is making a decision that can only be reviewed by other unelected
and almost unaccountable officials (Article III appellate courts); if these
unelected officials abuse their power, the only way to stop them is by
constitutional amendment or impeachment. Thus, "[b]ecause of their very
potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion."50
The United States Supreme Court has found the following powers
necessary for a federal court to achieve "the orderly and expeditious
disposition of [its] cases"51: the power to punish for contempt,52 the power
to control admission to its bar,53 the power to discipline the attorneys
appearing before it,54 the power to vacate its own judgment if that judgment
was fraudulently obtained,55 the power to investigate independently any
such fraud, 56 the power to bar disruptive defendants from the courtroom, 57
sanction for the failure of plaintiff's counsel to appear at a pretrial conference).
49 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.").
50 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.
51 Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31.
52 See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 217-27 (1821) (discussing the
English common law roots of an American court's inherent power to punish for
contempt, in the context of whether the House of Representatives holds a similar power
to punish for contempt); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-12 (1874)
(upholding an attorney's disbarment and punishment for contempt, after the attorney
refused to answer the court's questions regarding whether he had counseled a client to
avoid being served with a grand jury subpoena).
53 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (holding that district courts
have the inherent authority to allow ex-Confederate officers to regain their membership
in the federal bar).
54 See Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824) ("The power [to discipline
attorneys] is one which ought to be exercised with great caution, but which is, we think,
incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the
respectability of the profession."); see also ABA, MODEL FEDERAL RULEs OF DiscaI'NARY
ENFoRcEmENT pmbl. (1978) (providing that "[court name here], in furtherance of its
inherent power and responsibility to supervise the conduct of attorneys who are admitted
to practice before it... promulgates the following Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement).
55 See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946)
(upholding a district court's sua sponte investigation into another court's decision that
would potentially have resjudicata effect in the investigating court, after allegations of
judicial bribery were made in reference to the other court's decision); Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (holding that equitable relief against
fraudulent judgments is an inherent power remedy devised by courts to alleviate
hardships arising from the general court-made rule that judgments should not be
disturbed after the expiration of the term at which they were entered).
56 See Universal Oil Prods., 328 U.S. at 580.
57 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (holding that a prisoner who was
repeatedly warned to restrain his behavior, and who was advised that he could return to
the courtroom as soon as he behaved properly, lost his constitutional right to be present
at his trial when he persisted in disrupting the proceedings).
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the power to dismiss a complaint on grounds offorum non conveniens,58 the
power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to prosecute,5 9 and the
power to assess attorney's fees against an opposing attorney.60
Lower federal courts have expanded this list and added some powers
that have yet to receive Supreme Court review. 61 These powers include: the
power to levy fines against an attorney payable into court,62 the power to
preclude claims or defenses, 63 the power to limit a litigant's future access to
the courts,64 the power to assess the costs of needlessly impaneling a jury,65
the power to set counsel fees for attorneys appointed by the court,66 and the
power to appoint a special master to assist the court in hearing complex
cases.
67
58 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504-08 (1947) (discussing the policy
reasons supporting a federal district court's inherent power to refuse to exercise
jurisdiction even if that jurisdiction is expressly granted by the Constitution or an act of
Congress).
59 See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam) (upholding the district court's dismissal of the case after the
plaintiff's counsel willfully refused to answer interrogatories or otherwise proceed with
the pretrial phase of the litigation); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31
(1962).60 See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 765 (1980).
61 See generally ABA, SANcnoNs: RuLE 11 AND OTHER PowERs 36-37, 56, 78, 96-
97, 121-24, 145-47, 169-70, 183-84, 206-07, 220-21, 236, 251 (Melissa L. Nelken ed.,
3d ed. 1992) (discussing the inherent powers jurisprudence of each of the federal courts
of appeals).62 See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11 th Cir. 1985) (upholding a
district court's fine against a defense attorney who secretly solicited exclusion requests
from potential members of the plaintiff class).
63 See supra note 34 (discussing a federal court's ability to impose sanctions under
Rule 37(b)(2)(C).
64 See Lysiak v. Commissioner, 816 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(upholding access limitations in the case of a tax protester who repeatedly sued the
federal government claiming that the Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified); Urban v.
United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding access limitations in
the case of a pro se litigator who filed dozens of actions against imaginary governmental
units and sought to have them heard in a nationally televised jury trial before the
Supreme Court); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1258-59, 1262-64 (2d Cir. 1984)
(upholding access limitations in the case of a law school graduate who had been refused
admission to the bar for character reasons and, in retaliation, filed hundreds of lawsuits
against anyone associated with the legal profession, including an action to have himself
appointed guardian ad litem of the district judge's children).65 See Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (upholding an
order requiring an attorney to reimburse the government for impaneling a jury after that
attorney ignored all offers to settle before accepting an offer on the day of the trial);
Nesco Design Group, Inc. v. Grace, 577 F. Supp. 414 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (requiring
attorneys to reimburse the government for the cost of impaneling a jury after the
attorneys did not notify the court that the case had been settled until one hour before jury
selection was to commence).66 See Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that a
district court has the inherent power to adopt a rule establishing a guideline schedule of
contingent fees for use in personal injury actions brought by seamen).67 See In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920) (upholding the appointment of an auditor
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Many of the inherent powers listed above overlap with statutory or rule-
based sources of authority.68 The overlapping sources of sanctioning
authority have operated in tandem since 1991, when the Supreme Court
decided that statutory or rule-based sources of sanctioning authority did not
supplant a court's inherent power to sanction.69 Thus, a court need not
exhaust its statutory or rule-based remedies before turning to its inherent
powers so long as the statutes or rules are not "up to the task" of effectively
responding to all of the sanctionable conduct before the court.70 Of
particular relevance here, a court need not exhaust the sanctions provided by
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3771 before invoking its
inherent power to sanction discovery abuse.72 All that is necessary is a
finding of bad faith;7 3 because Rule 37 does not provide a means of
enhancing the sanction in cases where a litigant exhibits bad faith, Rule 37 is
not "up to the task," and the sanctioning court may rely solely on its inherent
powers to fashion an appropriate sanction. 74
B. Why the Third Circuit Held the Community Service Sanction
Account To Be an Impermissible Departure from the Court's
Inherent Powers
In Tutu I, Judge Brotman was faced with litigants and counsel who
to assist the court in analyzing the voluminous evidence presented in a complex contract
dispute); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding the
appointment of a special master to assist the court in monitoring a state's efforts to
comply with an order to correct unconstitutional prison conditions); Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 864-65 (8th Cir. 1956) (upholding the appointment of a
special master to assist the court in determining which of an attorney's subpoenaed
records were privileged and which were not). The inherent power to appoint a special
master has been codified in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
68 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c), 16(f), 26(g), 30(g), 37, 41(b) & 56(g); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1912, 1927 (1994); FED. R. APP. P. 38. Much of this overlap is of relatively recent
origin: the foundations of a court's inherent powers extend back far beyond the current
age of statutes and rules. Not all of a federal court's inherent powers are of such ancient
origin, however. It was not until 1980 that the Supreme Court held that one party's
attorney's fees could be taxed specifically to the opposing party's counsel. See Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) (holding that the American rule does not
necessarily apply in the presence of bad faith, and that bad faith on the part of counsel
can expose them to personal liability for the opponent's attorney's fees).69 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (finding no conflict between
Rule 37 and a federal court's inherent power to sanction discovery abuse when the abuse
is perpetrated in bad faith).7 0 See id. at 49-50.
71 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (providing sanctions for failing to make or cooperate in
discovery).
7 2 See id.
7 3 See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANcTIoNs: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE
§ 25(A)(1) (1989 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the necessity of finding bad faith before
eschewing Rule-based sources of sanctioning authority).
74 See id.
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willfully abused the discovery process; 75 therefore he eschewed Rule 37
sanctions in favor of inherent power sanctions that could address bad faith.76
Unfortunately, his chosen remedy represented an extraordinary departure
from the current understanding of a federal court's inherent powers.
Judge Brotman relied on two premises when formulating the community
service fund sanction. First, he noted that "[p]ursuant to its inherent powers,
this court has the power to sanction the Esso Defendants and their former
counsel by requiring them to pay a monetary fine [into court]. ' '77 Second,
Judge Brotman decided that he had the inherent power to sanction the Esso
Defendants and Goldman Antonetti by ordering them to physically perform
community service of his choosing.78 Armed with those two premises, Judge
Brotman combined them to conclude that he could order the Esso
Defendants and Goldman Antonetti to pay someone else to perform
community service of his choosing. 79 The first premise-that a district court
may impose a fine payable into court-is well-supported by case law.80 The
second premise-that a district court may sanction discovery abuse by
ordering community service pursuant to its inherent powers-is
extraordinary. As the Third Circuit noted, there is absolutely no precedent or
other authority that would permit Judge Brotman to order community
service as a sanction for discovery abuse. 81
Having determined that Judge Brotman's sanction was novel and unique
because one of its premises was unprecedented, the Third Circuit then had to
decide if Judge Brotman's sanction was within the scope of his inherent
powers. The court properly concluded that it was not, but the reasoning set
forth in the opinion is conclusory and unsupported by informative citation to
authority. In other words, the Third Circuit apparently reached the correct
decision by gut reaction-the Community Service Sanction Account just did
not pass their "smell test."' 82 Although this author agrees with the court's
75 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the willfulness of the
discovery abuse).76 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing a district court's
ability to properly ignore the sanctions provided for in the Rules and statutes).
77 Tutu MI, 166 F.R.D. 331, 345 (D.V.I. 1996).
78 See id. at 347-48.
79 See id. at 349.
80 See supra note 62.
81 See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d 368, 385 n.17 (3d Cir. 1997). Judge Brotman cited Brent
Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1226-29 (1983), to support the conclusion that he
could impose a community service sanction for discovery abuse. See Tutu I, 166 F.R.D.
at 348. As the Third Circuit pointed out, though, the two criminal cases cited by that
article as authority for the imposition of monetary sanctions earmarked for community
service are not relevant to this case. See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 385 n.17 ("We find no
support in those cases for imposing such a sanction here. The opinions themselves do not
discuss the sanctions at all, though the law review article claims that the monetary
sanctions were imposed as conditions for probation or nonprosecution.").82 A "smell test" is an imprecise, vague assessment of the validity of an action
without express reliance on a specified legal theory. One court has noted in connection
with "smell tests" that "the most important item in the courtroom and all too seldom used
is the judge's nose. Any trial [or appellate] judge will inevitably come to the conclusion
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conclusion, a more exhaustive analysis of the issues involved seems to be in
order.
C. Searching Beyond the "Smell Test"for a More Principled
Approach
The Third Circuit began its analysis by briefly tracing the origins and
character of a federal court's inherent powers. 83 The court then briefly
explained why it was reversing Judge Brotman's decision; because this
second part of the opinion is so critical to this Note's analysis, it is worth
exhibiting in its entirety:
No matter where one places their origin, it is clear that the power exercised
in this case cannot be derived from a court's inherent powers. The district
court's actions are essentially legislative in nature. Although we recognize
that the line between a judicial act and a legislative act is difficult to fix
with certainty, the district court's sanction here falls on the legislative side
of whatever line we may draw. The court ordered the reallocation of
resources from private entities to an agency of the public sector not a party
to the case. It chose from whom the resources would be taken and to whom
the resources would redound, without regard to the anatomy of the case
before it[84]. In so doing, the court ventured well beyond the case and
controversy[ 85] before it.
We do not find persuasive the argument that a court's inherent powers
include the wielding of what is essentially a legislative power. We believe
that it is not in the nature of courts of justice normally to engage in the
redistribution of wealth to parties outside of the litigation. We find nothing
in Article I that allows for such a power. 86
The court's conclusion is seemingly obvious-there is little doubt that
federal courts should not legislate87 -and the Criminal Justice Complex in
on occasion that a certain case or claim or defense has a bad odor. Simply put, a matter
smells. Some smell so bad they stink." Morgan Fiduciary, Ltd. v. Citizens & Southern
Int'l Bank, 95 B.R. 232, 234 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
83 See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 383-84.
84 This is not exactly correct. Judge Brotman did choose "from whom the resources
would be taken" with regard to the Tutu litigation; parties to that litigation were
sanctioned for their conduct in the course of that litigation. Judge Brotman also chose "to
whom the resources would redound" with regard to the Tutu litigation, albeit loosely. He
decided to direct the money to the criminal justice system because doing so would confer
"a direct benefit on the parties and/or others affected by [the] sanctionable conduct"--
namely, the people of the Virgin Islands. Tutu III, 166 F.R.D. at 349.
85 This would appear to be an indirect citation to the Case or Controversy Clause of
Article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution. Although the Third Circuit did not
directly cite that Clause or any decisions interpreting it, the court appears to use the ideas
behind the Case or Controversy Clause to decide this case. See supra Part ll.B.
86 Tutu IV, 120 F.3d at 384 (citations and footnotes omitted).
87 See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States."); United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 456 (1995) (discussing Supreme Court's obligation to
avoid judicial legislation).
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St. Thomas was clearly not involved in the present case or controversy.8 8 It
would seem that the Community Service Sanction Account should plainly
run afoul of the Case or Controversy Clause in Article I. Why, then, did the
court not cite to the Case or Controversy Clause or to any decision
interpreting that clause? The answer is that, surprisingly, there is no decision
in Case or Controversy Clause jurisprudence that directly supports the Third
Circuit's decision. Although it would seem obvious that Judge Brotman
impermissibly departed from the "case or controversy" before him, there is
no precedent that even tangentially addresses the unusual facts of this case.
Thus, the Third Circuit faced a dilemma; it could create an entirely new
branch of Case or Controversy Clause jurisprudence when deciding this
case, or it could take intuitive guidance from the Case or Controversy Clause
(i.e., apply a "smell test") and decide the case as a simple matter of the law
of inherent powers. The court wisely chose to avoid a constitutional
decision,89 but in so doing rendered an opinion lacking the detailed analysis
that such a constitutional decision would provide. What follows is an
analytical framework that supports the Third Circuit's decision on
constitutional grounds. This analysis is not offered as a criticism of the Third
Circuit's opinion; rather, it is a more detailed explication of why the
Community Service Sanction Account failed the court's "smell test."
IV. THE CASE OR CONTROVERSY CLAUSE
As noted above, extant Case or Controversy Clause jurisprudence fails
completely to address the facts of this case.90 All is not lost, though. By
examining the goals that are served by Case or Controversy Clause
jurisprudence and the specific doctrines used to achieve those goals, one can
give substance to the Third Circuit's gut feeling that Judge Brotman's
sanction went too far. In other words, the result in this case is entirely
consistent with Case or Controversy Clause jurisprudence despite the
absence of a specific precedent on point.
88 But see supra note 40 (discussing Judge Brotman's familiarity with the Criminal
Justice Complex's problems through other litigation).
89The desire to avoid constitutional decisions usually arises in statutory
interpretation cases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (construing a
statute so as to avoid a constitutional decision); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961) ("'When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn into question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."') (citing Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). Nevertheless, the problems with deciding issues on
constitutional grounds are just as acute in nonstatutory interpretation cases. See generally
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REv. 979, 989 (1987) (stating
there is a necessary distinction between the Constitution and constitutional law and "[t]o
confuse the Constitution with judicial pronouncements allows no standard by which to
criticize and to seek the overruling... [of] cases such as Dred Scott and Plessy v.
Ferguson").90 See supra Part II.C.
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A. Goals of Case or Controversy Clause Jurisprudence: Interbranch
Harmony, Adjudicative Decisionmaking, and the Preservation of
Individual Autonomy
There are three primary goals underlying Case or Controversy Clause
jurisprudence. These goals are not explicitly enumerated in Article IllI of the
Constitution; the Supreme Court has extracted them from its philosophical
understanding of the Case or Controversy Clause and the structure of the
Constitution in general.
The first goal is interbranch harmony within the three branches of the
federal government. 91 This judicial restraint is necessary in order to preserve
the separation of powers that lies at the heart of our Constitution's system of
government. 92 By limiting the federal courts' jurisdiction to actual disputes,
the Founders attempted to ensure that federal courts would remain reactive
institutions and not usurp the proactive functions of the other two branches
of government.
The second goal is adjudicative, as opposed to legislative,
decisionmaking by the courts.93 Courts function best, and reach the most just
results, when they confine their deliberations to the facts before them.94
Unlike legislators and administrative agencies, courts are formally presented
with a very narrow range of information when making decisions; therefore,
courts function best when they exercise their power only over the narrow
issues that can be properly explored in litigation.
The third goal is the preservation of the individual autonomy of
parties.9 5 "[Constitutional decisions are [best] rendered at the behest of
91 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 737 (1984) ("[T]he 'case or controversy'
requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers
on which the Federal Government is founded.").92 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States .... "); Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ('The executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."); Id. at art. Ill, § 1 ('The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
93 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89 (3d ed. 1996)
("[T]he case or controversy requirement might ensure that constitutional issues will be
resolved only in the context of concrete disputes rather than in response to problems that
may be hypothetical, abstract, or speculative. This consequence... distinguishes
legislative and judicial decisionmaking .... ).94 See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) ('The paramount importance of
vigorous representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system of'justice. This
system is premised on the well-tested principle that truth-as well as fairness-is 'best
discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question."') (quoting Irving R.
Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A.B.A. J. 569, 569
(1975)); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) ('The
premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed
boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions
presented and argued by the parties before them.").
95 See Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1182 (9th Cir. 1984) (dissenting
opinion) ("Article III of the Constitution imposes on federal courts the jurisdictional
hurdle of the 'case or controversy' requirement because they 'are not commissioned to
roam at large, gratuitously righting perceived wrongs and vindicating claimed rights.'")
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those actually injured rather than at the behest of bystanders attempting to
disrupt mutually advantageous accommodations or to impose their own
views of public policy on government. '96 The two parties to a bilateral
relationship are usually the only parties who should be able to use the justice
system to alter that relationship; outsiders rarely have the knowledge
necessary to properly advocate an insider's position in litigation and may not
have the insider's best interests in mind.97
B. The Implementing Doctrines of Case or Controversy Clause
Jurisprudence
There are three specific Case or Controversy Clause doctrines that the
Supreme Court has developed to achieve the three goals underlying Case or
Controversy Clause jurisprudence. These doctrines limit the jurisdiction of
federal courts so as to achieve the goals of interbranch harmony,
adjudicative decisionmaking, and individual autonomy that Case or
Controversy Clause jurisprudence seeks. These three doctrines do not
correspond directly to the three goals; in other words, each doctrine serves
more than one goal, and no doctrine is the sole means of achieving a given
goal. Imagine these doctrines as pillars standing together to support the goals
of Case or Controversy Clause jurisprudence; the doctrines are the
functional structures that serve Case or Controversy Clause goals in specific
cases.
1. The Ban on Advisory Opinions
The first doctrine is the ban on advisory opinions. This doctrine
basically prohibits federal courts from issuing opinions on abstract or
hypothetical actions that have not yet occurred. 98 The goals served by this
(quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 290 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Lea
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofArticle .I: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HAv. L. REv. 297, 310-15 (1979) (characterizing one function of the
"case or controversy" requirement as the protection of the self-determination interests of
nonlitigants).
96 STONE Er AL., supra note 93, at 89.
97 Note that this is a qualified statement-the words "usually" and "rarely" are used
to acknowledge the exceptions to the rule. For example, in some situations the lack of a
lawsuit may stem more from poverty or ignorance than from satisfaction with the status
quo. See generally Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of
Third Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 393
(1981).98 The Framers of the Constitution considered and rejected a proposal that would
have allowed the President and Congress obtain advisory opinions from the Supreme
Court. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONvENrIoN at 1787, 340-41 (Max Fan-and
ed., 1911). The Supreme Court has consistently resisted efforts to extract advisory
opinions from it. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 n.14 (1968) (observing that
the ban on advisory opinions was established as early as 1793, and has been followed
without deviation since then); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (striking
down a jurisdictional act of Congress as an attempt to circumvent the Case or
Controversy Clause and obtain an advisory opinion).
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doctrine are interbranch harmony and adjudicative decisionmaking.
Interbranch harmony is preserved by limiting the number of opportunities
that the federal courts will have to interfere with the desires of the other two
branches of government. 99 Adjudicative decisionmaking is promoted by
eliminating the federal courts' ability to issue pure legislation, which-in an
informal sense-is what an advisory opinion actually is. 100
2. The Requirement of Standing
The second doctrine is the requirement of standing. This doctrine
basically requires that a litigant have a meaningful interest in the outcome of
the litigation; the details of the law of standing attempt to describe what
constitutes a "meaningful interest" in a given case.101 The goals served by
this doctrine are individual autonomy and interbranch harmony. Individual
autonomy is directly served by preventing third parties from using the courts
to interfere with mutually advantageous relationships between others.1 02
Interbranch harmony is promoted, again, by limiting the opportunities for
the judiciary to interfere with the other two branches 103
3. The Requirement of Proper Timing
The third doctrine concerns timing; that is, whether the question being
litigated is ripe for review or whether it is moot. The central question is
whether the interests of the parties are sufficiently aroused so as to ensure
9 9 See, e.g., JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUmONAL LAW § 2.12(b)
(4th ed. 1991) ("[T]he power to render ... an advisory opinion is really a greater power
than... judicial review ... because it increases the situations where the Court can
exercise this significant power ofjudicial review.").
100 Legislation is distinguished from a judicial decision in that legislation is not
aimed at resolving an existing dispute between specific parties, but instead is aimed at
establishing a rule for future parties. See Oklahoma City v. Dolese, 48 F.2d 734, 738
(10th Cir. 1931) ("Legislation consists of formulating a rule for the future. A judgment
applies the law to past or present facts."). To the extent that an advisory opinion is based
on hypothetical facts and inchoate wrongs, it too is aimed at the future and not at
resolving an existing dispute between specific parties.
101 "Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such."
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
Things have not improved much in the twenty-nine years since the Supreme Court
acknowledged the disarray in standing jurisprudence. See generally Kenneth Culp Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968); NowAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 99, at 82-83 ("[T]he reluctance of the Court to find standing in some cases as
opposed to others supports the view that the law of standing, as a practical matter, is used
as a decisional tool by the Court to avoid disposing of certain cases on the merits.");
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SuPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF PoLITIcs 132 (2d ed. 1986) (1962) (extolling the tactical use of the standing doctrine
to avoid "the ultimates of legitimation and invalidation" associated with a ruling on the
merits).
102 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of individual
autonomy).
103 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of
interbranch harmony).
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the proper functioning of the adversarial system.10 4 This doctrine is closely
related to the prohibition on advisory opinions and the requirement of
standing. In essence, a judicial decision on a moot issue-an issue in which
a litigant no longer has a "meaningful interest" would constitute an illegal
advisory opinion. Like legislation, the decision would only be meaningful to
future parties. Similarly, a judicial decision on an issue that was not yet ripe
for review-that is, an issue that is not sufficiently concrete to warrant
adjudication-would also constitute an illegal advisory opinion, and the
inchoate nature of the wrong would deprive the plaintiff of standing.
The timing doctrine promotes both interbranch harmony and
adjudicative decisionmaking. Interbranch harmony is promoted, again, by
limiting the number of cases in which a federal court may interfere with the
other two branches of government.' 0 5 Adjudicative decisionmaking is
enhanced by limiting federal jurisdiction to concrete cases in which there are
clearly developed facts and-if warranted--clearly appropriate relief.10 6
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASE OR CONTROVERSY CLAUSE
GOALS AND THE COMMUNITY SERVICE SANCTION ACCOUNT
The two goals that appear to be threatened by the Community Service
Sanction Account are interbranch harmony and adjudicative
decisionmaking. Interbranch harmony is threatened by Judge Brotman's
decision to transfer $1,000,000 from private parties to an agency of the
executive branch of the government of the Virgin Islands for a specified use.
Although the Virgin Islands' elected officials may welcome the additional
money in this case, 107 the precedent set by Judge Brotman's decision would
104 Imagine a standard bell curve, with the horizontal axis representing time and the
vertical axis measuring litigant interest. An issue is properly timed for judicial decision at
the moment when litigant interest is at its peak; that is, when the litigants are sufficiently
motivated to do their part in our adversarial system ofjustice. An issue is not yet ripe for
review when litigant interest is to the left of the peak on the bell curve; that is, when the
case or controversy has not yet become concrete enough for proper adjudication. See
Fritz Scharph, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 531-32 (1966) (discussing how the Supreme Court is more likely to
require a well-developed record in close constitutional cases because an unenforced
statute sheds no light on that statute's real-world impact). An issue is moot when litigant
interest is to the right of the peak on the bell curve; that is, when the litigants no longer
have a sufficient interest in the case to justify judicial action. See, e.g., DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1972) (dismissing a challenge to a law school's preferential
admission policy because the plaintiff, who was admitted pursuant to a lower court's
order and was now in his final term of classes, would be allowed to graduate regardless
of the outcome of the appeal).105 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of
interbranch harmony).
106 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (stating that legal questions should be
resolved "in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences ofjudicial action").
107 Not surprisingly, the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands filed an amicus
curiae brief with the Third Circuit supporting the decision below. See Tutu IV, 120 F.3d
368, 371 (3d Cir. 1997).
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facilitate future judicial interference that could easily lead to conflict. The
legislative and executive branches of government implement their policy
choices, in part, by spending more money on some endeavors than on others;
interbranch conflict would arise as soon as a judge ordered money spent on a
cause that the elected politicians would rather not fund.10 8
In addition to the threat to interbranch harmony, the goal of adjudicative
decisionmaking is obviously threatened by the fact that none of the parties to
this case so much as mentioned the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas
in their advocacy; 0 9 Judge Brotman decided to bestow the $1,000,000 on it
without the benefit of any representation by the parties. The third goal,
individual autonomy, is not implicated because no outside party here is
seeking to interfere with an established, mutually advantageous relationship.
Thus, two of the three goals of Case or Controversy Clause
jurisprudence appear to be threatened. In order to determine if the
Community Service Sanction Account actually harms these two goals, it is
necessary to distill from the implementing doctrines-which do not directly
address the facts of Tutu 10-a set of common features that are used to
achieve the two goals that are threatened by the creation of the Community
Service Sanction Account. In other words, we are discerning common
features of the existing implementation doctrines in order to see if the Third
Circuit's decision in Tutu is consistent with those features. If Tutu is
consistent with those features, then the Third Circuit's decision supports the
goals of Case or Controversy Clause jurisprudence, and Tutu could have
been decided on Case or Controversy Clause grounds.
A. Extraction, from Case or Controversy Clause Implementing
Doctrines, of Features Used to Achieve Case or Controversy Clause
Goals
The first threatened goal is the goal of interbranch harmony.
Examination of the three Case or Controversy Clause implementing
doctrines reveals that the primary feature used to curb judicial encroachment
on the other branches of government and achieve the goal of interbranch
harmony is the requirement that the judiciary be the last resort.111 The
108 Imagine the uproar if a federal judge decided to establish a community service
sanction account for the benefit of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). See Eric
Pianin, Interior, NEA Bill Approved But May Face Clinton Veto, WAsH. PoST, Oct. 29,
1997, at A21 (reporting "a crusade by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and other Senate and
House conservatives to eliminate all spending for the-NEA").
109 Judge Brotman did have knowledge of the Criminal Justice Complex's
problems-he just obtained it outside of the Tutu "case or controversy." See supra note
40 (discussing Judge Brotman's familiarity with the Criminal Justice Complex's
problems through other litigation).
110 See supra Part llI.C (discussing the inapplicability of extant Case or Controversy
Clause jurisprudence to the facts of Tutu).
111 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ('The power to declare the rights of
individuals ... is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination
of real, earnest and vital controversy.").
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advisory opinion ban prohibits the judiciary from commenting on
hypothetical situations and, therefore, reserves judicial power for use only
when there is no other alternative for the litigants. 112 The standing doctrine
keeps the judiciary from ruling in cases in which the plaintiff is not
personally at risk and, therefore, reserves judicial action for those situations
in which the plaintiff will certainly suffer if the court does not act.113
Finally, the timing doctrine prevents the judiciary from deciding cases in
which the concerns of the parties are not at their peak; that is, cases in which
the parties are not hanging on the edge of their seats waiting for the court's
action.114 Only when judicial action is the last resort will a case be properly
timed. In summary, then, all three implementing doctrines feature the "last
resort" principle as a way to restrain the judiciary and keep it in its proper
reactive role. Courts of justice should not be proactive; they should respond
only to situations that arise in which the judiciary is the parties' last chance
for justice.
The second threatened goal is the goal of adjudicative decisionmaking.
Examination of the three "case or controversy" implementing doctrines
reveals that the primary feature used to achieve the goal of adjudicative
decisionmaking is the requirement that courts decide only actual
controversies that are litigated by the persons who have the most acute
interest in the outcome of the case. In other words, adjudicative
decisionmaking is promoted by limiting the courts' power to real
controversies in which all aspects of the situation are presented, and the
court decides only the actual problem between the parties. This feature of all
three implementing doctrines is readily discerned. The ban on advisory
opinions limits the judiciary to actual, concrete controversies;I S the
standing requirement limits the judiciary to hearing only cases litigated by
the most interested parties; 116 and the timing doctrines limit the judiciary to
hearing only those cases in which the litigants' interests are at their peak. 117
Thus, to recap, the Constitution's Case or Controversy Clause has
historically been interpreted to promote two goals that are relevant to this
analysis: interbranch harmony and adjudicative decisionmaking. Three
doctrines have been implemented to achieve these goals: the ban on advisory
opinions, the standing requirement, and the timing requirement. Although
none of these three implementing doctrines is directly applicable to the facts
of Tutu, it is possible to recognize in these implementing doctrines two
features that can be used to determine if the Community Service Sanction
Account threatens the goals of the Case or Controversy Clause. These two
features are the requirement that the judiciary be the last resort, and the
requirement that courts decide only actual controversies that are litigated by
the persons who have the most acute interest in the outcome of the case. If
the Community Service Sanction Account is not to defeat the goals of Case
112 See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the ban on advisory opinions).
113 See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the standing requirement).
114 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the timing doctrines).
115 See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the ban on advisory opinions).
116 See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the standing requirement).
117 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the timing doctrines).
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or Controversy Clause jurisprudence, then Judge Brotman's sanction must
be compatible with these two features. On the other hand, if the Third
Circuit's decision to reverse contains these features, then the decision fits
well within extant Case or Controversy Clause jurisprudence.
B. Analysis of the Community Service Sanction Account in Light of
These Extracted Principles
The Community Service Sanction Account is incompatible with both of
these features. As for the feature that courts only exercise their power as a
last resort, the creation of a Community Service Sanction Account simply
was not the last resort in this case. In fact, none of the parties in the Tutu
litigation even had a direct interest in the Criminal Justice Complex or asked
for a remedy addressed to it; thus, there is no plausible argument that any
party to the Tutu litigation felt that the Community Service Sanction
Account was its last chance for judicial relief.
As for the feature that courts only decide actual controversies litigated
by sufficiently interested parties, no one argued the merits of giving the
money to the jail instead of some other cause. 118 There was no actual
controversy-other than the one Judge Brotman created, of course-over
whether the sanction money should go to the court, the Criminal Justice
Complex, or some other recipient. Judge Brotman's decision to award
$1,000,000 to the Criminal Justice Complex apparently came as a complete
surprise to the parties in the Tutu litigation.119 He created his own
opportunity to decide how to allocate the money and then made that decision
without any adversarial representation. It is hard to imagine an action less in
keeping with the feature that courts only decide actual controversies litigated
by sufficiently interested parties; it is hard to imagine a less adjudicative
decision.
In conclusion, then, the Community Service Sanction Account failed the
Third Circuit's "smell test" because it did not match the common features
found in the doctrines that implement the goals of the Case or Controversy
Clause. Although nothing in Case or Controversy Clause jurisprudence
directly addresses the unique facts of Tutu, the Third Circuit properly
concluded that the creation of the Community Service Sanction Account was
not within the "case or controversy" before the court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Brotman clearly exceeded his authority when he created the
Community Service Sanction Account and ordered the Esso Defendants and
Goldman Antonetti to fund it. Although the Third Circuit's reliance on the
118 Thank goodness-the last thing an already overburdened federal judiciary needs
is a system of "litigative grants" in which competing interests litigate the question of
which needy cause is to reap the bounty of a sanction proceeding.
119 Nothing in Tutu I, 162 F.R.D. 46 (D.V.I. 1995), or Tutu II, 162 F.R.D. 81
(D.V.I. 1995),--the two decisions that preceded the establishment of the Community
Service Sanction Account in Tutu III, 166 F.R.D. 331 (D.V.I. 1996)-gave any clue that
Judge Brotman was contemplating an unusual sanction.
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law of inherent powers provides an adequate and reasonable rationale for its
decision, a more structured approach can be taken by applying the
Constitution's Case or Controversy Clause. This alternative approach
demonstrates that the common features of extant Case or Controversy
Clause jurisprudence are entirely consistent with the Third Circuit's
disposition of this case, and in so doing it helps to clarify the limits of an
Article HI court's inherent power to sanction for discovery abuse.

